Introduction
Self-censorship is a major threat to press freedom around the world. Even in democratic countries where direct government suppression of the press is absent, news organizations may still censor their own coverage on sensitive topics for political and economic reasons (Bagdikian, 2004; McChesney, 2004) . In authoritarian countries, selfcensorship is often institutionalized in newsrooms and internalized by journalists (Mickiewicz, 2000; Sukosd, 2000) . The most intriguing cases, however, occur in transitional societies where severe political pressure on the press is combined with a commercial/commercializing media system and a professional/professionalizing journalistic force. In these societies, on the one hand, the possibility of direct political repercussions could lead news organizations to think twice on whether to publish certain stories or how to cover particular topics (e.g., Zhao, 1998; Amin, 2002) . But on the other hand, the commercial orientations of the news organizations and the professionalism of the journalists may occasionally require them to defy the attempts of government control. It results in a tension-filled situation and a politics of selfcensorship that involves a strategic contest between media and political actors.
The use of language is likely to be a key part of this strategic contest. Discursive strategies can be devised and deployed by news organizations to make controversial topics, sensitive information, and critical viewpoints 'reportable.' For example, Li (2004) examines the narrative and argumentative strategies a market-oriented newspaper in China used to report on the plight of underprivileged groups in China's urban area. The strategies are, according to Li, instrumental in generating a 'politically correct' coverage that would resonate with urban residents.
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At the same time, media organizations may employ discursive strategies to justify or camouflage their practices of self-censorship, so that they will not be perceived by the public as bowing to political power. Just as cowardice may be disguised as prudence, submissiveness to political power may also hide behind certain journalistic norms. This latter argument is consistent with critical journalism studies' emphasis on the ideological consequences of professionalism (Tuchman, 1978; Fishman, 1980; Hackett and Zhao, 1998) .
Based on these considerations, the present study examines the role of discursive strategies in the politics of self-censorship in Hong Kong, where press freedom has been an important concern over the past two decades. It analyzes the editorials of two local newspapers published in the first half of year 2004 on political reform in the city. The analysis addresses the following questions: What are the discursive strategies employed by the newspapers in addressing the issue? Do these strategies aid the expression of critical views?
Or do they construct an appearance of professionalism only to mask the docility of the newspaper? Answering these questions should help us better understand the politics of selfcensorship in Hong Kong. More generally, it should contribute to our understanding of the role language plays in the struggle for press freedom in transitional societies.
Press freedom and self-censorship in Hong Kong
To put the present study into context, a brief discussion of press freedom in Hong Kong is needed. Since the return of Hong Kong to China was confirmed in the early 1980s, the future of press freedom has become a major concern in the city. Early studies showed that power transfer was accompanied by shifts in 'journalistic paradigms' (Chan and Lee, 1991) .
Most notably, the 'rightist papers,' which were critical towards the Chinese government, have moved towards a more centrist stance over the years. The range of ideological viewpoints propounded by the media has been narrowed down even before the actual handover in 1997.
4
However, it does not mean that press freedom was immediately and severely damaged after the handover. Understanding that the 'systems' in the Mainland cannot be imposed upon Hong Kong, the Chinese government has promised that the city will be governed under the principle of 'one country, two systems.' At the same time, China wanted to use Hong Kong as an example to lure Taiwan into re-unification. Hence, in the first few years after the handover, China has refrained from openly intervening into Hong Kong affairs.
1 Regarding the press, Chinese officials have insisted that the Hong Kong media cannot advocate Taiwan or Tibet independence. They also warned the media not to attack Chinese national leaders personally (Lee and Chu, 1998) . But other than these 'national issues,' the media were left largely free to criticize the Hong Kong government on local matters (Lau and To, 2002; Holbig, 2003 ).
China's reluctance to change Hong Kong's 'existing systems' also means that official media censorship has not been institutionalized. Instead, by the early 1990s, it has already become clear to observers that self-censorship, rather than formal censorship, would constitute the major threat to press freedom in Hong Kong (Scuitto, 1996; Schell, 1996) .
Conceptually, self-censorship refers to 'a set of editorial actions ranging from omission, dilution, distortion, change of emphasis, to choice of rhetorical devices by journalists, their organizations, and even the entire media community in anticipation of currying reward and avoiding punishment from the power structure' (Lee, 1998) . Its presence in Hong Kong has been documented in different ways. Surveys have shown professional journalists' recognition of the existence of self-censorship in the Hong Kong media (Lee, 1998) . Lam (2003) , based on his own experience as a journalist, provides a collection of cases of media downplaying negative news and promoting positive news about China. Cheung (2003) , through comparing Hong Kong newspapers with the New York Times and a Taiwan daily, illustrates that the Hong Kong media avoided a number of sensitive issues when covering the political tension between the Mainland and Taiwan.
5 Nevertheless, the politics of self-censorship is complicated by the commercial nature of the city's media system 2 and the professionalism of the practitioners. As business organizations, Hong Kong media have to concern themselves not only with political pressure but also with their credibility in the eyes of the consumers. The Hong Kong public largely believes in the media's role in providing an independent forum for public debate and in monitoring the power holders Lee et al., 2005) . Meeting these public expectations will help media organizations to prosper. This is especially important for newspapers because of the highly competitive local market. 3 Moreover, providing information to the public, monitoring the government, and to be independent from political and economic power are also the core values of Hong Kong journalists (Chan et al., 1996) . From the perspective of professionalism, self-censorship has to be condemned.
As a result, some media organizations have adopted methods that allow them to handle political pressure, market expectations, and journalistic integrity at the same time.
Borrowing the term from Tuchman (1978) , Lee (2000) describes such methods as 'strategic rituals.' He identified three such rituals used by the Hong Kong press since the handover. First, newspaper editorials have become more docile, yet many papers continued to provide space for columnists who are highly critical towards the power center. This, in effect, shifts at least part of the political risks from the news organizations to the individual writers. Second, newspapers have used the method of juxtaposition more frequently, so that critical views were balanced by pro-government views. Third, newspapers have also adopted more factual narrative forms in their political news reporting practices.
Analytically, these strategic rituals differ from mere self-censorship in that they are justified by journalistic norms such as objectivity and neutrality. On the positive side, media organizations can alleviate the political pressure they face while continuing to perform their normative and democratic roles by deploying such strategies skillfully. For example, 6 juxtaposition at least means a space for critical viewpoints, while sensitive information can be embedded in a factual narrative. But it is also possible that some media organizations are simply deploying such strategies as a mask for their own submissiveness and docility. To remain objective, for example, can be an excuse for not entering into a direct confrontation with the government even when the situation calls for it. As Lee et al. (2004) explicate, professional norms such as objectivity are both constraining and enabling for Hong Kong journalists. Their desirability has to be discerned in each specific case.
Background of the case, data and method
On January 7, 2004, then Chief Executive of the Hong Kong government Tung Cheehwa delivered his annual Policy Address. Media and public attention was focusing on the issue of democratic reform. The Basic Law, the mini-constitution for the city, recognized the goal of gradual democratization. It specified the method for selecting Hong Kong's Chief
Executive only up to year 2002. It was time for the city to review its political system. The democrats were calling for popular elections of the Chief Executive in year 2007, while opinion polls at the time showed a large majority of citizens supporting the idea. Disappointingly, Tung failed to provide a concrete timetable for democratization.
Instead, he revealed the Chinese government's concern with the city's political reform and emphasized the need to discuss with Beijing about certain 'matters of principles' before the review can formally begin. It was soon clear that the Chinese government was determined to assume a leading role in the debate on political reform. It argued that political development in the city is not just a local issue. The line between national and local matters was breached. For the first time since the handover, the Chinese government intervened deeply and openly into public debates in the city. At the same time, the role of the Hong Kong government was severely diminished. The debate on democratic reform is a critical case for examining the status of press freedom in Hong Kong. It involves conflicts between national and local interests, which present a dilemma to the Hong Kong media. They risk losing their audience's trust if they betray the local interests of democratization. Yet protecting local interests would mean pitting oneself against the Chinese government. Studying how news organizations dealt with such conflicts in this case would allow us to discern the limits of press freedom in the city.
The present study, however, is more specific in its analytical focus. It examines the discursive strategies used by two newspapers -Ming Pao and Apple Daily -in their editorials.
The two papers were selected due to their significance in the media scene in Hong Kong. The mass-oriented Apple Daily is the second most popular newspaper in the city, while Ming Pao has the largest circulation among the elite-oriented papers. More important, large proportions of the readers of the two papers are strong supporters of democratization. It is shown by an on-site survey conducted during the above-mentioned July 1 demonstration: 20% of the demonstrators were readers of Ming Pao, and 50% were readers of Apple Daily.
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Nevertheless, it does not mean that the two papers have adopted the same approach in covering politics. In the past few years, Ming Pao has been more concerned with maintaining its own credibility through emphasizing the principle of objective news reporting (Lee et al., 2004) . Apple Daily, on the other hand, has used criticisms towards the Hong Kong 8 government as a marketing strategy (Lee, 2000) . In fact, this difference would be very important for understanding the findings in the following analysis.
The present study's focus on editorial is premised upon its special role for newspapers.
Editorials are supposed to be persuasive and are less tied by the norm of objectivity. They represent the news organizations' active participation in public debate (Le, 2003) . Therefore, they are places where ideological biases can be more readily discerned (Hackett and Zhao, 1994) . In the case of Hong Kong, editorials should also be one of the best sites for observing how newspapers handle sensitive political topics.
The textual corpus for the present study consists of 51 editorials of Ming Pao and 68 editorials of Apple Daily. The texts were derived from the online archives of the two papers.
They constitute all editorials addressing the various issues related to democratic reform in Hong Kong published by the two papers between January 1 and July 5, 2004. The researchers read through all the texts closely to identify the major discursive strategies adopted in the editorials. Here, a discursive strategy is defined in a general manner:
as the use of language and linguistic devices in a way which can be interpreted as a method to handle the political situation at the time. When a discursive strategy was identified, attention was paid to how it was constituted by and practiced with the use of various discursive features, such as lexical choices, metaphors, labeling and categorizations of agents, and argumentative structures. The social significance of the discursive strategies is interpreted in relation to the cultural assumptions and meanings invoked by the language used and also in relation to the larger context of media and politics in Hong Kong. Overall speaking, the analytical approach of this study is inductive and interpretive. It is aimed at constructing what philosophers and anthropologists would call a 'thick description' (Ryle, 1955; Geertz, 2000) of the newspaper editorials under examination, that is, a description of the editorials that would arrive at their social import and significance within their own specific contexts.
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But as the researchers read through the texts, it was clear that a systematic comparison between the discursive strategies of the two papers can proceed by focusing on the different storylines and subject positions projected by the discourse of the editorials of the two papers as well as how they position different parties and themselves in the storylines. Therefore, we drew on positioning theory in discourse studies for our analysis (Davies and Harre, 1990; Harre and Langenhove, 1999 (Davies and Harre, 1990) . While many discourse studies have
drawn on positioning theory to analyze conversations or talk-in-interaction, we find the discourse analytic tools of positioning theory useful in our analysis. In fact, the overall storylines constructed by the two newspapers can be regarded as the 'master frameworks' behind the editorials, while the more specific discursive strategies are used to sustain, justify, and/or modify these master frameworks. The following discussion, therefore, begins by analyzing how two political stances and overall storylines were constructed by the two different newspapers. We then proceed to analyze the more specific discursive strategies employed by each newspaper to sustain, justify, and/or modify the storylines.
Constructing political stances and master stories
In the past, Hong Kong newspapers used to be classified in terms of their political stance towards China. For instance, one well-established social practice among Hong Kong people involves calling a paper 'tsan-jung' 10 (pro-China) or 'jo-paai' (leftist) in contrast to calling a paper 'yauh-paai' (rightist). As mentioned above, many Hong Kong newspapers have moved from these two stances towards a centrist stance even before the 1997 handover (Chan and Lee, 1991) . How to encode and decode a political stance depends a lot on the interpretive and sense-making resources shared by members of the discourse community who draw on similar repertoires of linguistic resources to both signal and recognize such categories (Sacks, 1966 (Sacks, /1992 Chinese verbs take 'Hong Kong affairs' as its object phrase and index (Silverstein, 2003) a very negative image of the agent, i.e., the subject of the verb. Typically such verbs are used when the agent of the action is a foreign power who meddles in the affairs of another sovereign country; i.e., these verbs are used only when the agent does not have sovereignty over the recipient of the action. As the Chinese government holds legal sovereignty over Hong Kong, when such verbs are used a strong set of assumptions about the independent sovereignty of Hong Kong (albeit not legally ratified) is signaled and asserted.
As Table 1 On the contrary, these two words were never used to modify the action verbs of the Chinese government in Ming Pao's 51 editorials.
[ Table 1 (literally: 'sell-country thieves') or 'hon-gaan' (defectors of the Han race). These terms were used, for instance, in the past to refer to Chinese people who colluded with the Japanese invaders in China during the Second World War and in other wars in ancient Chinese history.
These category names invoke strong nationalistic condemnation of a group of inside-people who are not only unpatriotic but also sell out the country's interest to foreign invaders.
In local parlance, 'kau mou-ji' (to cast hats) refers to the act of wrongfully accusing other people by assigning a political category label to them. Therefore, as long as calling someone a traitor or 'sell-country thief' is perceived as not based on valid grounds, it could be regarded as a case of a person 'casting hats' on others. Again, as shown in Table 1 , Apple
Daily used this verbal phrase ('cast hats on') more frequently to accuse the pro-China public figures of unjustifiably calling other people names (such as traitor or 'sell-country thief').
To provide a more holistic textual context for analysis, let us contrast the following excerpts from the two papers and see how they constructed the 'debate on patriotism'
differently. The editorials were published amidst heated public debates in the Hong Kong Tsang is a Hong Kong-based member of China's National People's Congress. The above passage not only directly criticized Tsang; it also extended the target of Tsang's criticism to include the participants of the July 1 demonstration. This extension makes Tsang's criticism more problematic and condemnable because ordinary citizens who peacefully exercise their rights to express their views are now all on the receiving end of criticism and classified as 'unpatriotic' by a politician who is described as wielding the 'kingly' power to distinguish patriots from non-patriots. These politicians' act of 'casting hats' ('kau mou-zi') on others (i.e., labeling one as patriotic or unpatriotic) is constructed as a threat to common people, invoking the idea of a regression of Hong Kong into an autocratic monarchy, with the people at the mercy of the arbitrary power of a king.
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On the contrary, Ming Pao seemed to be more cautious in singling out anyone to blame. Instead, it characterized the debate as involving two sides that are equally blameworthy. The following passage is illustrative:
If the discussion surrounding patriotism is calm and rational……then it is a good thing.
But the recent debate on patriotism is not like that. It is just different political factions The above excerpt implicitly invokes a storyline with three different groups of people:
(1) the 'leftists', (2) the 'democrats' and (3) 'Hong Kong people'. The leftists and the democrats are anaphorically referred to as 'different political factions', implying that they are not impartial but are interested, biased parties each with its own agenda. These two factions are engaged in debates which are 'abstract and subjective'. These debates will not 'enhance' but will 'dampen' the interest of the third (implicitly much larger) group: 'Hong Kong people'.
In this storyline, three collective subject positions are offered. The first two subject positions are highly negative ones and the third, 'Hong Kong people', is offered as the subject position for the readers of the newspaper to take up. At the same time, the authorial point of view occupies an almost transcendental, objective, uninterested, and rational subject position. The author, hence, is cast as someone who has the power and legitimacy to evaluate the actions of the 'political factions'. It invokes a seemingly rational moral order. The authorial voice invites the readers to take up this 'objective' position. The readers are implicitly led to take a critical stance towards the 'factions' and to see them as biased, interested, and engaged in actions that are damaging to the interest of the larger society.
Interestingly, China is missing in the cast of actors in the storyline, and therefore cannot be on the receiving end of any criticism. This can be regarded as a way to mask the potential culprit by sometimes erasing it, so that it is out of the attention of the readers. . In other words, the moral order that Apple Daily's storyline invokes is associated with the rights of a sovereign people (the 'Hong Kong people') to resist an outside power which is violently interfering with the internal affairs of these sovereign people.
We can see that the two newspapers' storylines offer very different subject positions to different parties as well as to the readers. This leads directly to difference in the degree of criticalness of the two papers' editorials. While Apple Daily is full of explicit and strong accusations and criticisms of China and the pro-China politicians, the language style used in
Ming Pao is that of the rational, unemotional, seemingly neutral genre. There is a tendency
for Ming Pao to avoid criticizing China, often by erasing China from the cast of actors in the storyline offered. However, does this lack of critical language style automatically give us the impression that Ming Pao was practicing self-censorship? Or, how could Ming Pao make a case of its own credibility and integrity in light of its apparent docility (albeit explicitly projected as a rational voice)? To address these questions, Ming Pao's lack of a critical language style has to be understood in relation to the other discursive strategies and legitimizing rhetoric that it has employed in their editorials.
The rhetoric of objectivity and rationality Besides this type of explicit acknowledgements, implicit acknowledgements can also be suggested with the use of metaphors:
We believe that, although the National People's Congress Standing Committee absolutely has the right to interpret the [Basic Law], interpretation of the Basic Law is the last resort; it is a heavy dose of medicine, the medicinal power is too strong and will lead to side effects; it should be used only when necessary. (Ming Pao, April 7)
By using medicine as a metaphor, China is cast as the well-intentioned doctor curing the ills of Hong Kong society. The passage not only asserted the goodwill of the National People's Congress, but also implicitly suggested that there is an illness that needs to be cured. Another important aspect of editorials, as well as news contents in general, is the use of information sources (Tuchman, 1978; Fishman, 1980; Le, 2004) . In their study of investigative journalism, Ettema and Glasser (1998) 'contain,' the passage treated the handling the flow of people in a demonstration and public opinion as the handling of flood. In the analogy, 'public opinion' becomes an administrative problematic rather than a democratic principle with moral force. A totally different imagerythat of the rational scientist finding the most efficient way to handle and contain flows and floods -with a totally different moral order is thus projected and asserted. Hong Kong people are cast as 'objects' which are likened to natural disasters to manage, contain and control and not active citizens with their agency and rights which demand and deserve respect.
[ Table 2 about here]
In fact, the different roles assigned to 'the public' and 'public opinion' by the two newspapers constituted key aspects of the overall storyline provided by the two papers. How the two papers characterized agents in the debate thus deserve some further elaboration here.
As Table 2 shows, both newspapers mainly used the labels 'Central Government,' 'Beijing Government,' or simply 'Beijing' to characterize the Chinese government. What is peculiar to Apple Daily, however, is its occasional use of the phrase 'dong-kyuhn-je' (power-wielders) to refer to Chinese leaders. This phrase emphasizes the actual political power that Chinese leaders possess and conveys a weaker sense of legitimacy when compared with labels such as 'Central Government.' But the most important and dramatic difference between the two papers is the extent to which the Democratic Party was named and the phrase 'mahn-jyu-paai'
(the democrats' faction) was used. The Democratic Party is the largest pro-democracy political party in Hong Kong, while 'the democrats' faction' is used in public discourse as a label to encompass all local politicians supportive towards quicker democratization of the city.
Apple Daily almost did not mention the two terms at all. This can be seen as a significant absence, which implies that such a term is a derogatory category name used by outsiders (Sacks, 1966 (Sacks, /1972 Sacks, 1966 Sacks, /1992 . By using such positive category names, Apple Daily foregrounded the public support that was arguably backing the democrats. At the same time, these labels also suggest that the actual conflict involved in the debate of democratic reform was one between the Chinese government and the Hong Kong public, with the 'democrats' serving merely as the public's representatives.
In contrast, the term 'the democrats' faction' appeared very frequently in Ming Pao's editorials. More important, the link between 'the democrats' faction' and 'public opinion' is much more tenuous and questionable in Ming Pao's editorials, as in the following example:
Excerpt 6:
If Beijing is willing to make peace with the democrats……the democrats will face huge public pressure to become a more responsible political party, instead of going against the government all the time. (Ming Pao, February 19) This passage can be understood only with a number of assumptions which contribute to the "local coherence" (van Dijk, 1988) of the text. These assumptions include at least the following: 1) the democrats have been going against the government all the time, and 2) the public regards this as irresponsible. These assumptions, of course, were not created out of nothing, but were indeed negative views towards the democrats widely circulated in public discourse. In other words, Ming Pao drew upon such negative views and discourses about the Last but not least, Ming Pao adopted the principle of proceduralism in their editorials' treatment of democratic reform in Hong Kong. Proceduralism is the idea that an outcome can be regarded as just and legitimate as long as it results from people following a set of fair and impartial procedures (see Rawls, 1973: 83-90) . Hence, one way for Ming Pao to highlight its 'transcendental' status as an impartial observer and arbitrator of the debate on democratic reform is to emphasize not specific viewpoints but a specific procedure, namely, rational public discussion:
Excerpt 7:
In fact, up till now, debates between different standpoints in the society can help the public understand the issue of political reform from different angles. In this sense, all voices are constructive. (February 1, Ming Pao)
[ Table 3 about here]
As Table 3 shows, the lexicons central to the idea of rational discussion -rationality By using these words the editorial writer appeals to the shared traditional cultural practices of Chinese people and implicitly condemns any effort on any party to break harmony by initiating fights of words.
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Second, the possibility of rational discussion also comes from the existence of common values and pre-existing agreements, which serves as the common ground and starting point for discussion:
Nevertheless, the Central Government and the SAR have an important common interest, that is, to maintain political stability in Hong Kong, and to practically resolve Hong Kong people believe that differences can be narrowed down through rational discussions, and consensus can be reached in a step-by-step manner. Ming Pao thus did occasionally criticize the Chinese government. However, by adding qualifications and by shifting the focus from the 'substance' (i.e., democracy) to the procedure (i.e., dialogue), political criticisms became less sensitive, yet also less powerful.
The bias of objectivity
By employing the rhetoric of objectivity and rational discussion, Ming Pao posited itself as an impartial arbitrator of an ongoing debate. But as numerous journalism scholars have recognized, reportorial and discursive practices of objective journalism can lead to their own biases (e.g., Tuchman, 1978; Fishman, 1980; Hackett and Zhao, 1998; Condit and Selzer, 1985; Erjavec, 2003) . Ming Pao's rhetoric of objectivity is not an exception. Table 4 .
[ Table 4 about here]
There is no question that most Hong Kong people would want prosperity and stability.
However, when these two single values are emphasized, the pursuit of democracy becomes instrumental. Democracy is needed because it promotes political stability, which in turn contributes to the pursuit of prosperity. This instrumentalist argument is not necessarily wrong, and at least it is an argument supportive towards democratization. The problem is whether it would displace other, non-instrumentalist arguments. An important non-instrumentalist argument is the notion of 'kyuhn-leih' (rights). Democracy can be regarded as important because it is Hong Kong people's natural or legal rights to have it. But as Table 4 shows, Ming Pao invoked the notion of people's rights to democracy only twice in the corpus. Apple
Daily, in comparison, has adopted the rights perspective to a much larger extent.
Hence, Ming Pao's editorials were actually biased towards certain social values over others. The same applies to a number of key political principles regarding the relationship between China and Hong Kong. Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has emphasized that Hong Kong will be governed under the principles of 'yat gwok, leuhng jai'
(one country, two systems), 'gong yahn jih gong' (Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong) and 'gou-douh jih-jih' (high degree of autonomy). In the past two decades, these principles were premises in political discourse regarding Hong Kong's relationship with China. In the debate on democratic reform, however, the Chinese government insisted that the issue is not merely a local matter. In other words, from China's perspective, 'high degree of autonomy' is irrelevant in this case.
This background allows us to understand the figures shown in Table 4 . Placing more emphasis on common values and principles, Ming Pao mentioned 'one country, two systems'
and 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong' repeatedly. However, it used the phrase 'high degree of autonomy' less frequently than Apple Daily did. More important, the two papers invoked the principles for different purposes. While Ming Pao mentioned the principles mainly as commonly accepted principles and as bases of public discussions, Apple Daily, in contrast, was appropriating the principles to criticize China (as further discussed later).
Besides biases towards certain values and principles, Ming Pao's editorials also exhibited a bias towards established 'facts.' For Ming Pao, rational discussion must be grounded in facts and a proper understanding of the reality constraints. The purpose of public 26 debate is to discover the best course of future action. In the terminology of stasis theory in the study of rhetoric, Ming Pao has adopted mostly the genre of deliberative rhetoric. This is contrary to Apple Daily's largely epideictic rhetoric, which focuses on meting out praises, blames or censures for contemporary actions and issues (Fahnestock, 1986) .
The problem for the debate on democracy in Hong Kong is that not all parties have equal power in defining 'reality' and establishing 'facts.' As Ming Pao's deliberative rhetoric restricted the paper from challenging existing facts, its editorials thus exhibited a tendency to accept the 'reality' established one-sidedly by the Chinese government. Although we did not wish to see this sudden interpretation of the Basic Law, the NPC did hold the legal right to do so……Now, the pragmatic thing to do is to accept the political arrangement after the interpretation. This is the political reality. At the same time, [we] should focus on resolving concrete issues in Hong Kong's political reform.
Similarly, the Central Government also needs to face the reality, facilitating political reform in Hong Kong, and responding to Hong Kong people's demand for democracy.
(italics added)
In this extract, Ming Pao asserts and accepts China's legal right to interpret the Basic Law and asks the reader to be 'pragmatic'-to accept this political arrangement. The sentence 'This is the political reality' implicitly invites the reader to accept this arrangement (i.e., interpretation of the Basic Law by China) without any complaints so as to be 'pragmatic' and to focus 'concrete' issues in Hong Kong's political reform. However, what kind of concrete reforms can be achieved if it is defined one-sidedly by the Chinese government?
Rhetorically the editorial writer writes, 'Similarly, the Central Government also needs to face the reality, facilitating political reform in Hong Kong, and responding to Hong Kong people's demand for democracy.' The appeal to the Chinese government to respond to Hong Kong people's demand of democracy comes after appealing to Hong Kong people to be pragmatic and to accept the political reality (that China has the final say in interpreting the law). This order is significant: the first appeal almost voids the force of the second appeal. The second appeal is done to complete the rhetorical balancing act of issuing requests to both parties in a dispute. Although it phrased Hong Kong people's demand for democracy as a 'reality' that China needed to respond to, inequality in actual political power means that the Chinese government can easily disregard such a 'reality.' As a consequence, an emphasis on facing the reality in this condition of inequalities in actual political power has contributed to a bias 
Discursive strategies for modifying political criticisms
The above two sections have mainly focused on Ming Pao's discursive strategies for justifying and sustaining the overall storyline that it proffered in order to reduce the political sensitivity of its editorials. Apple Daily, as shown earlier, has adopted an overall storyline 28 which is much more critical towards China. However, it does not mean that Apple Daily has had no concern at all with the political pressure they face. The paper has also adopted discursive strategies that render their political criticisms somewhat less sensitive than they would have been. In this sense, although Apple Daily's overall storyline and approach was critical, their critical stance was also modified by specific methods.
As mentioned, one method Apple Daily used to construct criticisms is to appropriate the discourses of the Chinese government. China's past promises were emphasized not as common values of Hong Kong and China, but as standards for judging the Chinese government's current actions:
The so-called interpreting the Law is in fact changing the law. for their reputation in history when they need to ask those in power to do something good. In this editorial, the writer did not draw upon other modern cogent grounds (e.g., human rights, It posited itself as the impartial arbitrator on the issue of political reform. The storyline it constructed cast government officials and politicians as belonging to different faction, with the Hong Kong public located at the center. Readers are thus implicitly invited to identify with a centrist position. These strategies reduced the need for the paper to directly criticize China, and they also reduced the sensitivity of the criticisms provided. Apple Daily, on the other hand, posited itself as the defender of public opinion and local interests. It constructed the storyline of a sovereign people having its rights and freedom encroached upon by a powerful entity. Hence the paper was much more direct in criticizing Chinese officials and conservative politicians, though it also modified the overall storyline and smoothed out the radicalism of its critiques by employing the discursive strategies of staying within the dominant discursive formation, articulating internal contradictions, and decentralizing the Chinese government.
The strategies employed by the two papers are different in two important ways. First, the strategies Apple Daily used might have reduced the paper's radicalism a bit, but overall speaking, the editorials remained highly critical towards the power holders. In fact, Apple Daily has been identified by some Chinese officials as a 'problem newspaper' in Hong Kong.
Reporters of the paper are often denied access to China, and the organization itself is denied the opportunity to enter China's lucrative media market (Lam, 2003) . On the contrary, Ming
Pao's rhetoric of objectivity and rational discussion has led to a bias towards conservative values and the group(s) with the power to define 'reality.' This confirms the general argument in journalism studies that the norm of objectivity often inadvertently leads to biases towards the status quo (Tuchman, 1978; Fishman, 1980; Hackett and Zhao, 1998; Ettema and Glasser, 1998 (Chan et al., 1996) . Moreover, as discussed earlier, the politics of selfcensorship in Hong Kong is complicated. The commercial nature of the media means that news organizations have to take care of both political and market pressure. A range of 'strategic rituals,' hence, was devised by media organizations to help minimize both political risks and loss of credibility (Lee, 2000) . Presumably, if such strategies are used skillfully, they would allow the media to handle political pressures without hugely compromising their own integrity. Intensified objectivity has been one such strategy (Lee et al., 2004) .
However, in the present case, the strategy of objectivity has constrained Ming Pao's ability to play its watchdog role properly. After all, this study focuses on editorials, the site for media organizations to actively participate in public debate (Le, 2003) . Editorials are where objectivity does not need to be strictly applied. In fact, as journalism scholars have recognized, the spatial separation between news articles and opinion-editorial pieces is a means for a newspaper to signify its commitment to objective news reporting on the one hand, while retaining a space for the paper to express its own viewpoint on the other (Tuchman, 1978; Hackett and Zhao, 1998) . Emphasizing the norm of objectivity in editorials only highlights a news organization's reluctance to state its own views.
Generally speaking, this study shows the importance of language in the politics of press freedom. The lack of press freedom and the existence of censorship or self-censorship have usually been discussed in terms of the existence of taboo areas and topics that the media cannot cover. However, there may not always be a clear boundary separating the allowed and the not allowed. In the gray, in-between area, the key to the politics of press freedom would be how to make certain things reportable through discursive means. At the same time, the politics of self-censorship may also involve media organizations discursively justifying their reluctance to say certain things. It might involve explicit, public justifications (Graber, 2004) , but it could also involve implicit justifications through the use of discursive strategies in news coverage and editorials, such that self-censorship puts on a mask and is presented as something else. The present study has pointed to the usefulness of positioning theory and the analysis of storylines and subject positions (Davies and Harre, 1990; Harre and Langenhove, 1999) to studying the topic. It has also identified a number of strategies relevant to the politics 36 of press freedom and self-censorship in Hong Kong. Future studies can focus on other cases, in Hong Kong and in other countries, and identify more strategies used for the purpose.
Theory-based typologies of the discursive strategies can also be developed.
In addition, a more comprehensive analysis of the discursive politics of selfcensorship can also include considerations of how the public reads the media texts. In the present study, it is argued that the strategies used by the newspapers are for the purpose of maintaining credibility and handling political pressure. But admittedly, the present study cannot tell if such strategies indeed help the newspapers to maintain credibility in the eyes of the public. This latter question has to be considered in terms of how readers understand and decipher the texts. In fact, studies of political communication in authoritarian societies have sometimes emphasized the audience's ability to read between the lines (Mickiewicz, 2000) .
The 'active audience' should be taken into account in the study of media self-censorship.
Finally, it should be noted that such a discursive politics of press freedom and selfcensorship is likely to be particularly important in a transitional society such as Hong Kong.
More precisely, Hong Kong is a city where an authoritarian political system, a public and journalistic commitment to press freedom, and a commercial media system co-exist. The absence of formal censorship means that few things are, strictly speaking, unspeakable. Yet the political situation also constrains the range of ideas that can be expressed completely freely. In other words, the gray area between the allowed and the not allowed is particularly large. The existence of this large gray area provides the condition for language to play a significant role in the politics of self-censorship. Tables   Table 1  The lexicons The Democratic Party 7 39
The Democratic Faction (mahn-jyu-paai) 1 220 
